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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Recreationists are pitted against each other in this case
whereby a birdwatching organization has sued a skeet shooting
and firing range operation for violation of the Clean Water Act
(CWA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
The Birdwatchers of Groveton (BOG) and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) appeal the decision of the District Court, which held that a 2001 amendment to the CWA
extending jurisdiction over isolated waters did not govern the
case. BOG and EPA also appeal the holding that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Treaty Clause justifies federal regulation of
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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water pollution over the isolated Sheldrake Pond. With respect to
the RCRA issues, BOG and EPA oppose the lower court's decision
that fired shot and skeet parts are not "solid waste" when they fall
to the ground under the statutory definition. However, they part
company regarding the regulatory definition, since only Suave opposes the lower court's holding that fired and skeet parts are not
"solid waste" when they fall to the ground under the EPA's definition of "solid waste." This memorandum addresses all five legal
issues and explores arguments of all parties.
The CWA prohibits the addition of fill material or a pollutant
into navigable waters. The legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress intended the term "navigable waters" to be
interpreted to the fullest constitutional extent. A recent Supreme
Court decision, however, held that isolated waters were not within
the congressional definition of "navigable waters" thereby stripping federal regulatory jurisdiction over isolated waters used by
migratory birds. As a result, the Court skirted the constitutional
issue of whether it was within Congress' Commerce Clause authority to assert jurisdiction over insignificant, isolated waters
such as Sheldrake Pond. In response to the Supreme Court's decision, Congress amended the CWA's definition of "navigable waters" to incorporate isolated waters that are important stopovers
for migratory birds. At issue in this appeal is whether the amendment, which occurred eight months after BOG filed its complaint,
can be retroactively applied to Suave's firing and skeet shooting
range locale.
For twenty years, birdwatchers of BOG had been observing
migratory birds using Sheldrake Pond as a stopover, until Suave
began using the pond-side area as a firearms and skeet shooting
range. By applying the amended definition of "navigable waters"
to Suave's range, this appeal must determine if, in fact, Congress
has the authority to regulate activity involving isolated ponds
under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has established
three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the
Commerce Clause: 1) highways of interstate commerce; 2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and 3) activities substantially
affected by interstate commerce. The primary argument is that
Suave's activities either substantially affect the interstate commerce of hunting and observing migratory birds or that the aggregate of such activities substantially affects such commerce. The
resolution of this issue will hinge primarily on the assessment of
evidence on this point. Moreover, while BOG argues that the
7
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Treaty Clause justifies congressional usurpation of state authority
over isolated waters such as Sheldrake Pond, there is no indication that Congress was acting pursuant to the Treaty Clause
when it enacted the CWA.
The aim of RCRA is to reduce the generation of hazardous
waste and ensure proper treatment, storage, and disposal of that
waste. To hold that Suave has violated RCRA requires a finding
that shot and skeet parts are "solid waste." However, navigating
through the statutory and regulatory definitions of "solid waste" is
no easy mission, as they each apply to separate and distinct sections of the RCRA citizen suit regime. Congress' definition of
"solid waste," which includes "discarded material," applies to allegations that activities constitute an imminent and substantial endangerment. The EPA's regulatory definition of "solid waste" also
includes "discarded material" which is further defined in a complicated manner. The EPA's definition applies to allegations of violating RCRA's regulatory program. Ultimately, the issue of
whether fired shot and skeet parts are "solid waste" when they fall
to the ground for purposes of the RCRA citizen suits turns on
whether the EPA's "consumer use" exception applies. It is EPA's
position that the regulatory definition of "solid waste" excludes
commercial products used for their intended use, if their ordinary
use results in their landing on the ground. Therefore, it is the
task of this Court to analyze the appropriate deference to be afforded to the EPA's interpretation of the statutory and regulatory
definitions of "solid waste."
SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR THE JUDGES
Does the 2001 Congressional Amendment to the CWA's definition
of "navigable waters" apply to Suave's activities?
What law do the courts normally apply when there is a change in
the law during trial?
Is the legislative amendment retroactive to when BOG filed its
complaint?
Does it matter whether or not the amendment is retroactive since
Suave's activities are continuing?
Can congressional intent for retrospectivity be satisfied by an intention reflected in the report of only one chamber of Congress?
What are the policy reasons for prospective application of the legislative amendment?
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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Did Congress exceed its authority under the Commerce Clause in
amending the CWA to regulate isolated intrastate waters because
those waters do or potentially could serve as habitat for migratory
birds?
To what extent can the Report of the Senate Environment Committee be used to indicate congressional finding?
Would federal jurisdiction over isolated waters intrude upon
traditional state and local government authority to control land
use matters?
To what extent does the SWANCC decision apply to non-navigable, isolated, intrastate waters? Does the decision apply narrowly
to such waters based on their use by migratory birds or does it
extensively cover all non-navigable waters and waters not physically connected to navigable water?
Since migratory birds reside only temporarily in any location, how
can individual states effectively protect them absent a national
scope?
How can the holding in Missouri v. Holland, which relates to statutes and regulations protecting migratory birds under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, be reconciled with Suave's alleged violation
of the CWA?
Have the courts traditionally upheld Commerce Clause regulation
of intrastate activity only where the activity is economic in nature? Can the protection of suitable habitat for migratory birds
rise to a level of "commercial" activity?
Does the placement of fill within Sheldrake Pond constitute an
economic activity that in the aggregate has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce?
What are the policy implications of giving Congress the power to
regulate non-economic conduct having a substantial effect on interstate commerce?
Does the Migratory Bird Treaty justify a shift from state delegated authority to federal authority over isolated wetlands under
the Treaty Clause?
Is the Migratory Bird Treaty self-executing or non-self-executing
and how might that affect its constitutionality?
Does the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution constrain
federal regulation of isolated ponds under the Migratory Bird
Treaty?
9
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Was Congress acting pursuant to the Treaty Clause when it enacted the CWA in 1972?
Is federal regulation of water quality in isolated ponds a valid exercise of authority under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act?
Did the Court below err in holding that fired shot and skeet parts
are not solid waste when they fall to the ground under EPA's definition of solid waste in 40 C.F.R. § 262.2?
Did the Court below err in holding that fired shot and skeet parts
are not solid waste when they fall to the ground under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B)?
Does fired lead shot that hits the ground sit under the common
understanding of the term "discarded?"
How much, if at all, did EPA consider the "consumer use exception" in the Military Munitions Rule? Is it relevant to our
analysis?
Are the D.C. Circuit cases, considering the meaning of the statutory definitions of "discarded," relevant to our analysis?
Are the Chevron or Mead Supreme Court decisions relevant to
EPA's interpretation of its regulations?
What are the policy arguments for applying the "consumer use exceptions" to fired lead under the regulatory definition of "solid
waste?"
How much deference is EPA's interpretation of the statutory definition of "solid waste" entitled to? Under Mead, should the court
defer to EPA's interpretation of the statute? If not, what effect
does the decision of this court in NAG, which was decided under
Chevron, have on the case at bar?
How does the law of the circuit deal with intervening Supreme
Court decisions that do not address the holding of the precedent,
but reject its reasoning?
How persuasive is EPA's interpretation of the statute that Congress did not intend to regulate the use of consumer products for
intended purposes?
Why might it make sense to include fired lead shots, when they
aggregate in large quantities, under the statutory definition of
"solid waste" as used in § 6972(a)(1)(B)?
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

DOES THE 2001 CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT
TO THE CWA'S DEFINITION OF "NAVIGABLE
WATERS" APPLY TO SUAVE'S ACTIVITIES?

A. Suave Will Argue the Amendment Should Not Apply to the
Defendant Because of the Traditional Presumption
Against Statutory Retroactive Application
As with many canons of statutory construction, there is tension among the courts regarding retroactivity. Until the
landmark case Landgrafv. USI Film Products resolved whether
to apply statutory amendments retroactively or prospectively,
there was an apparent conflict, even within holdings of the United
States Supreme Court. 511 U.S. 244 (1994). One generally accepted canon was that "retroactivity is not favored in the law...
congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be
construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires
this result." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 480 U.S. 204, 208
(1988). The opposite canon was to apply the law in effect at the
time a court renders its decision, unless such application results
in manifest injustice or runs contrary to congressional intent. See
Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974). Although
the United States Supreme Court noted the "apparent tension" in
KaiserAluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, the Court found
it unnecessary to resolve the conflict because the congressional intent was clear and therefore governed. 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990).
While the Court in Kaiser chose not to resolve the conflict between
the two conflicting expressions, in Landgrafit had to focus on the
tension in the absence of instruction from Congress. The Court
ultimately held that where a new statute would impair rights a
party possessed when he acted, increase his liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already
completed, the traditional presumption against retroactivity applies absent clear congressional intent otherwise. 511 U.S. at 280.
There is a traditional presumption against retroactive application of a statute, absent a clear congressional intent favoring
such a result. See Landgraf,511 U.S. 244 (1994). The presumption against statutory retroactivity is founded upon elementary
considerations of fairness dictating that an individual has a right
to know what the law is and to conform his or her conduct accordingly. See id. at 265. Therefore, a law will not be construed as
retroactive unless the act clearly, by express language or neces11

460
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sary implication, indicates the legislature intended a retroactive
application. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 480 U.S. 204,
208 (1988) (holding that Department of Health did not have the
power to promulgate retroactive cost-limit rules because authority
to issue retroactive rules was not authorized by Congress).
The anti-retroactivity principle is expressed in several provisions of the United States Constitution. As noted by the Court in
Landgraf,"[tihe Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits retroactive
application of penal legislation." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 249. Although the action at bar is a civil matter, the Clean Water Act
("CWA") can be enforced criminally under 33 U.S.C. Section
1319(c) and Congress' amendment to the definition of "navigable
waters" applies to both civil and criminal cases alike. Other Constitutional provisions prohibiting retroactive legislation include:
the prohibition on States from passing laws "impairing the Obligation of Contracts" in Article I, Section 10, clause 1; the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause preventing the Legislature from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for a "public use" and upon payment of "just compensation; the prohibition
in Article I, Sections 9-10 preventing the legislature from singling
out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for
past conduct (prohibitions on "Bills of Attainder"); and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment which protects the interest in fair notice that may be compromised by retroactive
legislation.
According to the landmark case, Landgrafv. USI Film Products., in the civil context, prospectivity remains the appropriate
default rule unless Congress has made clear its intent to disrupt
settled expectations. Id. at 265. In Landgraf, the plaintiff was
sexually harassed by a co-worker at the defendant's workplace.
Id. at 244. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission determined, in an administrative action, that the plaintiff had likely
been the victim of sexual harassment, creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
but concluded that her employer had adequately remedied the violation. Id. at 248. In the plaintiffs subsequent judicial action
against the company, the District Court concluded that her decision to resign was not justified because the harassment was not so
severe and her employer had adequately remedied the violation.
Id. The court found her employment was not terminated in violation of Title VII. Thus, she was not entitled to equitable relief. Id.
at 249. Since Title VII did not then authorize any other form of
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17

12

20021

BENCH MEMO

relief, the court dismissed her complaint. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at
249. While the plaintiffs appeal was pending, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 became law, thereby creating a right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for certain Title VII violations, and
provided a right to a jury trial if damages were claimed. See Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-106, Sec. 102, 105 Stat. 107 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(a)). The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit rejected plaintiffs argument that her case
should be remanded for a jury trial on damages pursuant to the
1991 Act relying on the premise that "a court must 'apply the law
in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would
result in the manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or
legislative history to the contrary."' Landgraf, 968 F.2d at 432
(quoting Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)). The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's holding; finding that the
damages and jury trial provisions were not retroactive and therefore would not apply to cases pending on appeal when the statute
was enacted. See 511 U.S. 244.
The Court in Landgrafopined, "when a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events giving rise to the suit, a
court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly
prescribed the statute's proper reach." Id. at 280. As the Court
noted, the relevant legislative history reveals little to suggest that
members of Congress believed that an agreement had been
reached on the controversial retroactivity issue. Therefore, the
Court held that Section 102 should not govern cases arising before
its enactment because it authorizes punitive damages, sharing
key characteristics of criminal sanctions thus raising questions
under the Ex Post Facto Clause if retroactively imposed. See id. at
281.
Plaintiff filed its complaint eight months before Congress
amended the CWA definition of "navigable waters" to cover isolated waters such as Sheldrake Pond. Statutory law existing at
the time a complaint is filed governs the case, unless a subsequently enacted statutory provision explicitly directs that it be applied retroactively. See Landgraf,511 U.S. 244; Bowen, 480 U.S.
204. There is no express language, or necessary implication, in
the statutory language of the CWA amendment or its accompanying Senate Report, indicating the legislature's intent for retroactive application. See S. Rep. No. 106-528, at 23 (2001). Applying
the amended definition of "navigable waters" to the Defendant's
pre-amendment location of its rifle range and skeet shooting oper13
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ation at Sheldrake Pond would create liability under the CWA. As
clearly indicated by the U.S. Constitution and case law, a new enactment should not be held to judicially imply retroactivity if not
expressly provided, as in this case. The Ex Post Facto Clause of
Article I of the Constitution and the Takings and Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantee defendants a right to
fair notice of the legal consequences of their actions, a right which
would be jeopardized by retroactive application of the amended
definition of "navigable waters." Holding otherwise would put the
Defendant in a position of potential criminal sanctions and
thereby raise a serious question under the Ex Post Facto Clause if
retroactively imposed.
B.

BOG Will Argue Retroactive Application is Appropriate
Because Congress Intended the Statutory Amendment to
be Curative

Courts recognize the traditional presumption against retroactive application of a new enactment can be overcome by ordinary
statutory interpretation. In the landmark case governing this issue, the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe Constitution's restrictions, of course, are of limited scope. Absent a violation of one of
those specified provisions, the potential unfairness of retroactive
civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a
statute its intended scope." Landgraf,511 U.S. at 267. Therefore,
a strong argument can be made that courts interpret statutory
legislation as retroactive when the new measures will either ratify
prior official conduct or make remedial adjustment in an administrative scheme. See Nowak & Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw Hornbook 410 (4th ed. 1991).
BOG is likely to argue that Congress' 2001 amendment of the
CWA definition of "navigable waters" falls under one of two exceptions to the presumption against retroactivity. The general rule is
that application of curative legislation is acceptable if its function
is to repair the consequences of a "legal accident or mistake." One
example might be the failure of lawmakers to make provisions for
unforeseen circumstances which should have been provided for.
See Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 376
(6th ed. 2000).
In the Supreme Court case, Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., the Court gave an unexpected and expansive interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), thereby exposing
coal mine operators to a potential liability of over five billion dolhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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lars in claims of their employees. 328 U.S. 680 (1946). To remove
this liability, Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act, which
eliminated both the right to sue for the overtime pay claim at issue in Anderson and the jurisdiction of the courts to hear such
claims. See Nowak & Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw Hornbook 411
(4th ed. 1991). This retroactive measure not only cured a defect in
the existing legislation that arose because of the Court's interpretation of that legislation, but it also gave full effect to the original
congressional intent behind the FLSA. See id.
In the case at bar, Congress' Report accompanying the 2001
CWA amendment to the definition of "navigable waters" clearly
expresses the curative nature of the amendment: "The Supreme
Court's opinion in [SWANCC] misinterpreted congressional intent. . .. [Wie intended the terms to cover isolated waters that are
important stopovers for migratory birds." S. Rep. No. 106-528, at
23 (2001) (emphasis added). BOG will therefore argue that because the amendment was curative in nature, the presumption
against retroactive legislation is overcome and. the due process
clause limitation is not violated.
A second exception to the presumption against retroactivity
can be argued where a new rule merely clarifies or explains a previous rule. While this exception is strikingly similar to the first, it
is a somewhat stronger argument. The Supreme Court's decision
in Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996), supports this position.
In Smiley, the plaintiff filed suit in California against a bank
chartered in South Dakota, alleging the bank violated California
law by charging excessive late fees on a credit card. Id. at 738.
The bank argued federal banking laws allow a national bank to
charge interest at the rate allowed in the state of incorporation,
and the late fees were proper because they were a form of interest.
Id. at 745. After suit was filed, the Comptroller of Currency
adopted a new rule specifically including late fees in the definition
of interest. Id. at 740. The Court held that this rule could be applied retroactively to the plaintiffs case because the rule did not
alter the Comptroller's previous interpretation of the term "interest." Id. at 735.
A Florida State court decision in Envtl. Trust v. Florida, 714
So. 2d 493 (1998), also supports BOG's argument for retroactivity
and is on point with the case at bar. In that case, an Inland Petroleum Trust Fund was established in 1986 to encourage restoration
of ground waters and surface waters polluted by the discharge of
petroleum and related products from underground storage sys15
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tems. Id. at 495. The administator of the program, the Department of Environmental Protection, adopted a rule implementing
the statute. Id. On March 22, 1996, while a proceeding under the
rule was pending, the Department published its first notice of a
proposed amendment to the rule and promulgated the amendment on September 27, 1996. Id. at 496. When retroactive application of the amendment was challenged, the Environmental
Trust court stated that "an exception [to the proscriptive versus
retroactive application] may apply if the rule merely clarifies an
existing rule and does not establish new requirements." Id. at
500. Accordingly, the court held that the revised version of the
rule "can be applied retroactively because it merely restates the
Department's settled interpretation of the existing rule." Id. at
501.
In the case at bar, it can be similarly argued that the Conference Committee specifically stated in its Report accompanying the
1972 legislation that it intended the terms "navigable waters" and
"waters of the United States" to extend as far as the Commerce
Clause authority extends. Furthermore, the Senate Report accompanying the 2001 amendment reiterated that in 1972 Congress had "intended the terms to cover isolated waters that are
important stopovers for migratory birds." S. Rep. No. 106-528, at
23. In enacting the 2001 amendment, Congress was merely clarifying how it had intended the 1972 CWA definition to be construed. Therefore, retroactive application is appropriate.
C.

Retroactive Application is Irrelevant in this Case Since
Defendant's Violation of the CWA is Continuing

Whether or not retroactivity of the amended CWA definition
of "navigable waters" applies in this case is irrelevant since the
Defendant's violations are continuing today. Suave continues to
maintain the fill in Sheldrake Pond for the skeet ejection platform
without a CWA Section 1344 permit. Suave also continues to operate its skeet shooting and firing ranges, thereby discharging either fill material or pollutants into navigable waters without the
appropriate CWA permits under 33 U.S.C. Section 1344 or Section
1342 respectively. Accordingly, Congress' CWA Amendment will
apply at least to Defendant's violative activities taking place after
August 15, 2001 which are the same activities resulting from the
firing range and skeet shooting operation prior to the amendment.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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DID CONGRESS EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY UNDER
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN AMENDING THE
CWA TO REGULATE ISOLATED INTRASTATE
WATERS BECAUSE THOSE WATERS DO OR
POTENTIALLY COULD SERVE AS HABITAT FOR
MIGRATORY BIRDS?

Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as
amended, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (Clean Water Act, hereinafter "CWA") "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). One of the goals of the CWA
is to attain "water quality which provides for the protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife." Id. § 1251(a)(2). A
major tool in achieving this goal is a prohibition on the discharge
of any pollutants, including dredged or fill material, into "navigable waters," except in accordance with the Act. Id. §§ 1311(a),
1362(12)(A). The CWA provides that "the term 'navigable waters'
means the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas." Id. § 1362(7). The Conference Report accompanying the
CWA explained that "the conferees fully intend that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by any agency determinations which
have been made or may be made for administrative purposes. See
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972). Section 404 of the CWA,
33 U.S.C. § 1344, authorizes the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to issue permits for the discharge of dredged or
fill material into "navigable waters," defined by the Act as "waters
of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
On January 9, 2001, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"), the United
States Supreme Court held that the CWA did not authorize the
federal government to prohibit a landfill operator from filling isolated ponds on its property merely because the ponds were used as
a habitat for migratory birds. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). This case involved a proposal to convert a defunct gravel-mining pit to a nonhazardous landfill. Id. at 163. Since the parcel had not been utilized for forty years, the parcel had evolved into a natural woodland containing hundreds of seasonal and permanent ponds
utilized by plants and wildlife, including migratory birds. Id. A
maze of trenches and surface depressions remained, which created hundreds of seasonal and permanent ponds. Id. The Solid
17
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Waste Agency's plan to create a multi-county landfill would require 17.6 acres of ponds and small lakes to be filled as part of the
development with the Agency. Id. The Corps asserted jurisdiction over the isolated, intrastate ponds by deeming the water bodies as "navigable water" under the CWA and accordingly denied
the petitioner a permit to develop the property. Id. The Supreme
Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that the Corps exceeded its statutory
authority by asserting jurisdiction over these ponds. See 531 U.S.
159 (2001). The Court did not, however, reach the question of
whether Congress could exercise such authority under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Explaining its decision, the Court in SWANCC stated that it
found no indication in either the statute or the legislative history
that Congress intended to include such insignificant and isolated
waters within its CWA definition of "navigable waters." 531 U.S.
at 174. In response to the SWANCC decision, Congress amended
the CWA's definition of "navigable waters" to incorporate EPA's
definition of the "waters of the United States" from 40 C.F.R. Part
122.2. See Water Pollution Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-720
(2001). Included under the EPA's definition of "waters of the
United States," are "all other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams) ... playa lakes, or
natural ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which would
affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce.. .." 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2 (2001). The Report of the Senate Environmental Committee accompanying the Senate bill stated that the Supreme Court's
opinion in SWANCC misinterpreted congressional intent. See S.
Rep. No. 106-528, at 23. In fact, when Congress first enacted the
CWA in 1972, it intended the terms "navigable waters" and "waters of the United States" to extend as far as the Commerce
Clause authority extends. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, at 144.
Furthermore, Congress intended the terms to cover isolated waters that are stopovers for migratory birds as they are instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See id.
If Defendant prevails in its argument that amendments to a
statute should be applied prospectively, the statute that controls
this case is the pre-amendment statute. Since the Court has already interpreted the pre-amendment statute not to cover insignificant and isolated waters such as Sheldrake Pond, the Court
need not go further. However, should the Plaintiff prevail in its
argument that the amendment governs this case, then the Court
must address whether Congress exceeded its authority when it athttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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tempted to exercise its jurisdiction over insignificant, isolated
playa ponds such as Sheldrake Pond.
A.

There is No Constitutional Basis for Congress to Assert
Federal Jurisdiction Over Isolated Wetlands Which Do
Not Affect Interstate Commerce

Defendant, Suave, will argue that there is no constitutional
basis for Congress to assert jurisdiction over isolated wetland and
playa ponds such as Sheldrake Pond. By claiming to have jurisdiction over the isolated and primarily seasonal Sheldrake Pond
because migratory birds use them, Congress "obliterates the distinction between what is national and what is local." United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000). If federal authority reaches all water and wetlands used by migratory waterfowl,
there is nothing to prevent the federal government from regulating every tree in which migratory birds roost and every lawn on
which they feed. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 1, Solid
Waste Agency v. U.S. Army of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 991178). If migratory bird use supplied a sufficient connection to
interstate commerce because duck hunters and bird watchers
travel and spend money, then nothing would be so far removed
from interstate commerce that it cannot be linked to it in some
fashion. Id. (citing Pet. Br. 43-44 & n. 18). Its approach leaves the
commerce power "without effective bounds" that are "essential to
the maintenance of our constitutional system" of enumerated federal powers. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608; United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 555 (1995).
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court restricted the
scope of the federal Commerce Clause power to commercial activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce. 514 U.S. 549
(1995). The Court struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act of
1990, a federal statute prohibiting the knowing possession of firearms within 1,000 feet of a school. Id. The Lopez Court identified
two main reasons for its holding. First, the Court found that the
Act was not within the bounds of federal Commerce Clause powers because the Act, a criminal statute, did not regulate a commercial activity. Id. at 532. Second, the Court rejected the Act under
the Commerce Clause power because the Act did not require gun
possession to be connected in any way to interstate commerce. Id.
The Court commented that without jurisdictional language limiting the Act's application to gun possession affecting interstate
commerce, or legislative findings that it did affect interstate com19
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merce, the Court could not determine if Congress had a rational
basis to conclude that the Act substantially affected interstate
commerce. Id. at 563.
Plaintiffs will argue that the Report of the Senate Environmental Committee accompanying the proposed CWA amendment
in this case did, in fact, describe that migratory birds are instrumentalities of interstate commerce because they are hunted for
food and carried across state boundaries, and they are the objects
of recreational value for national citizens. S. Rep. No. 106-528, at
23. However, even if the Court were to deem the Report "congressional findings," the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
The Lopez Court identified three broad categories of activity
that Congress may regulate under the Commerce power. Lopez,
514 U.S. at 558. First, "Congress may regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce." Id. Second, "Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities." Id.
Finally, "Congress's Commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." Id. In respect to the last category, the Court
concluded that the activity must "substantially affect" interstate
commerce to be regulated. Id. at 559. Because the Act did not fall
within the first two types of regulation, the Court analyzed, under
the third category, whether the regulation of guns within school
zones substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. In determining whether an activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce, the Court implied that the activity regulated must be an
intrastate or interstate commercial or economic activity that affects interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. The government contended that the Act substantially affected interstate
commerce because violence produces costs affecting the national
economy. Id. The government further argued that guns within
school zones affect the quality of education, which in turn affects
the productivity of citizens and thus the national economy. Id.
However, the Court rejected the arguments because to sustain
them would "pile inference upon inference in a manner that would
...

convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause

to a general police power of the sort retained by the states." Id. at
567.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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In a more recent case, the Supreme Court reiterated that
Congress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause is not
without effective bounds. The Court in Morrison held that the
Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with authority to enact a civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. Upon its analysis under the Lopez framework, the Court found that the provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce; gender
motivated crimes were not economic activity; and the provision
contained no jurisdictional element establishing that such a federal cause of action was in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 609.
Moreover, the Morrison Court affirmed that the aggregation
principle may not be invoked to sanction congressional action
every time Congress chooses to regulate intrastate non-economic
activity. Id. at 613. Specifically, this Court held that the commerce power did not allow the federal government to regulate any
activity, such as violence against women, that could be linked
through a long causal chain to indirect and unspecified effects on
interstate commerce, such as impacts on jobs and medical costs.
Id. at 614. Because virtually all human activity has similar,
though attenuated, impacts on commerce, such a line of reasoning
would effectively grant Congress an unlimited authority to regulate any human activity. See Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation in
Support of Petitioners at 23, Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178). Similar to the
link between violence and commerce espoused in the Violence
against Women Act of Morrison, the Plaintiffs theory of a link between interstate commerce in bird hunting and watching and the
destruction of bird habitat proves too much. For if Congress may
regulate "waters" simply because they may be used by migratory
birds, then Congress would have no limits on its federal commerce
power to regulate any land or object used by any animal since the
ownership, breeding, sale, observation, hunting, and studying of
all animals surely has a great effect on interstate commerce. See
id. at 24.
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BOG Contends that the Use of Sheldrake Pond by
Migratory Birds for Habitat Provides a Constitutionally
Sufficient Basis for Federal Regulation Under the
Commerce Clause
1. The Placement of Fill Material in the Waters of the
United States is a Class of Economic Activity that
Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce

The Supreme Court has identified "three broad categories of
activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power":
(1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or person and things in interstate commerce; and (3) intrastate activities that "substantially
affect" interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citing inter alia, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)). Under
Lopez's third category, Congress may regulate interstate activities
that do not individually have a pronounced effect on interstate
commerce, if the aggregate effect of the class of activities is substantial. Id.
In Wickard v. Filburn,the Supreme Court upheld the application of a penalty provision of the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment
Act when a farmer grew wheat on his farm for personal use that
was more than the allotment permitted to him under the federal
scheme. Wickard, 317 U.S. 111, 117 (1942). The Act was adopted
to regulate the price of wheat on the national market. Id. at 128.
Filburn challenged the federal regulation that wheat grown for his
own use was beyond the Commerce power. Id. In its Commerce
Clause analysis, the Wickard Court reasoned that although the
impact on the interstate wheat market of this individual farmer's
activity was minimal, if all farmers engaged in the same activity,
the impact could be significant. Id. at 125. That one such person's
production of wheat may have had trivial effects upon commerce
was of no import, the Court held, "where, as here, his contribution,
taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far
from trivial." Id. at 127-28.
Similar to the matter in Wickard, the cumulative effect of filling in wetlands has a clear effect on interstate commerce, through
the decrease of commerce generated by migratory birds. The cumulative impact of not uniformly regulating isolated wetlands will
affect interstate commerce generated by hunters, photographers
and other recreationists who incur expenses to hunt or view the
migratory birds that depend on isolated wetlands during migrahttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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tion. Furthermore, even narrowly defining the class of regulated
activity as the filling of isolated wetlands used by migratory birds
would mean that destruction of those wetlands would have a substantial aggregate effect on interstate commerce. Isolated wetlands used by migratory birds provide a sufficient connection to
interstate commerce because wetlands form a part of a commercial enterprise which provides habitat for migratory birds that
subsequently generate commerce. Wetlands provide food, shelter,
resting and feeding places on migratory routes, and all migratory
birds depend on wetlands for their survival. See U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Update to the North American Waterfowl Management Plan 20 (1994). The filling of isolated wetlands is of particular concern because for many migratory birds, small isolated
wetlands provide a unique habitat that is essential to their survival. See Gibbs, Importance of Small Wetlands for the Persistence
of Local Populations of Wetland-Associated Animals, Wetlands,
vol. 13, no.1, Mar. 1993, at 25.
The reduction of migratory bird populations would substantially impact interstate commerce, as billions of dollars are spent
annually on hunting, recreational observation and study of migratory birds. For example, migratory birds are the object of hunting
activities that generate billions of dollars of commerce each year.
In 1996, 3.1 million people hunted migratory birds and spent more
than $2.99 billion doing so. See Southwick Associates, U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, The Economic Importance of Hunting 8
(1998). Among the migratory birds associated with Sheldrake
Pond and its banks are Mexican ducks, which are commonly associated with recreational hunting in the southwest. See Order Civ.
No. 01-8785, at 3. Like bird hunting, bird watching annually generates several billion dollars of commerce. In 1996, some 62.9 million Americans spent $29 billion on wildlife-watching activities,
including bird-watching. See National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife Associated Recreation 90-91, tbls. 39, 40 (1996).
Almost $20 billion is spent each year on equipment for wildlife
watching. See id. Out of 17.7 million bird-watchers, 14.3 million
people took trips specifically to observe, feed, or photograph waterfowl; 9.5 million took trips for other water-associated birds,
such as heron. See id. at 45, 90. More than six million people
crossed state lines in order to engage in bird-watching. See id. at
90.
Wetlands, including isolated wetlands, represent one of the
most important components in preserving environmental quality.
23
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Isolated wetlands are inherently valuable for their water filtration, flood and erosion control, and as wildlife habitat. The environmental services provided by wetlands are of value to the
national economy and have been estimated globally at more than
$330 billion annually. See Costanza et al., The Value of the
World's Ecosystem Services and National Capital, Nature, Vol.
387, May 15, 1997, at 259. These environmental attributes of isolated wetlands are similar to those of adjacent wetlands that the
Court found appropriate for federal regulation in United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134-35 (1985). In
Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court upheld application of the
CWA to an intrastate wetland adjacent to a navigable intrastate
lake. Id. at 134. The Court reasoned that the wetlands directly
impacted the quality of the lake water by serving as a natural filtration system. See id. at 133-34. Although the Court expressly
reserved judgment on the application of the CWA to an isolated
wetland, it did conclude that "the language, policies and history of
the [CWA] compel a finding that the Corps has acted reasonably in
interpreting the Act to require permits for the discharge of fill
materials into wetlands adjacent to the 'waters of the United
States.'" Id. at 139.
Sheldrake Pond is used in interstate commerce as part of an
interstate and international bird migration pathway between the
Gulf of Mexico and further south to the northern Great Plain and
further north, by migrating birds such as jacanas, avocets,
sandhill cranes, warbling vireos, and Mexican ducks. See Order
Civ. No. 01-8785, at 3, 5. To be sure, BOG members have been
bird-watching at Sheldrake Pond for two decades and have
sighted over two hundred birds species, many of which are migratory. The birding community is not restricted to regional interest,
as most birders travel interstate specifically to see species that are
only found in certain locales and have been sighted and logged by
fellow birders. Therefore, unlike the criminal statute in Lopez,
regulation of isolated wetlands ensures migratory bird habitat
that in turn, generates substantial commerce that can be construed as part of a "commercial" enterprise.
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The Protection of Migratory Bird Habitat Furthers a
Governmental and Public Interest that has Long
Been Recognized to be a Matter of National
Concern

The Corps' and EPA's exercise of regulatory authority in this
case falls well within constitutional limits. Because migratory
birds are a shared resource of the several states, their protection
has traditionally been regarded as a task most appropriately performed by the national government. "The protection of migratory
birds has long been recognized as 'a national interest of very
nearly the first magnitude."' North Dakota v. United States, 460
U.S. 300, 309 (1983) (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
435 (1920)). The Court in Holland explained that the protection of
migratory birds is an interest inherently unsuited to effective vindication by the States. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. Migratory birds
can be protected only by national action in concert with that of
another power. See id. at 431-33. In his opinion for the Court,
Justice Holmes stated that,
[tihe subject matter is only transitorily within the State and has
no permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with.
We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of
our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to
rely upon the States.
Id. at 435.
The protection of habitat is an integral feature of federal efforts to protect the well-being of migratory birds. The Court in
Holland emphasized that the protection of migratory birds is principally entrusted to the national government because it is a task
inherently unsuited to piecemeal accomplishment. Id. Thus, Congress' CWA assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over "isolated" waters used as migratory bird habitat is fully in keeping with
traditional conceptions of the "distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
No matter how comprehensively one State were to regulate wetlands, its regulation would never be able to adequately protect migratory birds whose survival necessarily depends on regulation
that insures the supply of wetland habitat in many States.
25
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The CWA Permit Requirement Under 33 U.S.C. § 1344,
is Environmental Regulation; not a form of Land Use
and Zoning Traditionally Reserved to the States
Contrary to Defendant's argument that the Migratory Bird
Rule intrudes upon the traditional authority of State and local
governments to engage in land use planning, the permit requirement in Section 1344 of the CWA does not constitute conventional
land use planning or zoning. To suggest that the regulation of
land and water use under the CWA should be scrutinized closely
under the Commerce Clause as regulation of "local" activities,
would be inconsistent with prior Supreme Court jurisprudence.
For several decades, the Court has recognized that "the power conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution,
or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more
than one State." Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981).
The CWA's Section 1344 is a form of environmental protection
or pollution control, see 33 U.S.C. § 1251, and leaves the ultimate
determination of land use to State and local authorities. In Cal.
Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987), the
Court found the distinction between land use planning and environmental protection critical to its preemption analysis. The
Court in Granite Rock upheld the authority of a state agency to
regulate the impacts of mining on federal public lands because it
found that the agency's review was limited to the environmental
impacts of mining and did not determine the underlying land use.
See id. The Court expressed the distinction as such, "[1land use
planning in essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate particular uses of
the land but requires only that, however the land is used, damage
to the environment is kept within prescribed limits." Id. at 587;
see also Hodel, 452 U.S. at 275-76. Similarly, Section 1344 of the
CWA does not dictate the particular use to which a parcel of property may be employed. Rather, it regulates the manner in which
the proposed use can be accomplished by eliminating or mitigating
the environmental impacts of fill.
3.
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DOES THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY JUSTIFY A
SHIFT FROM STATE DELEGATED AUTHORITY
TO FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER ISOLATED
WETLANDS UNDER THE TREATY CLAUSE?

BOG Will Argue Federal Jurisdiction Over Isolated
Wetlands Used by Migratory Birds is Constitutional
Under the Treaty Power

If federal jurisdiction over isolated wetlands used by migratory birds is rejected under the Commerce Clause, federal jurisdiction is nevertheless appropriate under the Treaty Power of the
United States Constitution. Constitutional provisions confer
treaty-making power to the federal government; specifically to the
President and the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.1. Other language expressly prohibits states from entering, in their own right, into
treaties or alliance. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, cl. 3. Moreover, Treaties are proclaimed in the text of the Constitution to be
the supreme law of the land and binding upon states. See U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The treaty power is specifically delegated to
the federal governments and the Tenth Amendment only purports
to apply to non-delegated powers. U.S. Const. amend. X. Therefore, the Tenth Amendment does not limit the treaty power.
Although there are no express limitations on treaty making in
the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has endeavored to
define the scope of the treaty power. Under the Treaty Power,
Congress may enact legislation to implement the provisions and
purposes of a treaty signed by the United States. This authority is
expressed in Article II, section 3, which states that the executive
shall "take care" that "the laws be faithfully executed" and was
reiterated in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In 1916,
the United States signed the Migratory Bird Treaty with Great
Britain on behalf of Canada to protect and regulate migratory
birds and their habitats. To implement the purpose of the Treaty,
Congress enacted legislation known as the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act ("MBTA") in 1918. The Act makes it unlawful "by any means
...to pursue, hunt, take ... export, import ... any migratory bird,
any part, nest, or eggs of any such bird." 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994).
In Holland the Supreme Court upheld the Act as a valid exercise
of the Treaty Power. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 416. The state of
Missouri brought a bill in equity to prevent the Migratory Bird
Treaty, and the regulations made pursuant to this agreement,
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from being enforced by the federal game warden. Id. at 431. Missouri claimed ownership of the birds within its border and argued
that the statute was "an unconstitutional interference with the
rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment ..... Id. at
431. The federal government argued that the Treaty and its implementing legislation took precedence over any conflicting state
regulation. Id. at 417-24. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the MBTA based on articles II and VI of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 434. Recognizing that birds were of
important national interest, Justice Holmes stated "[w]ild birds
are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership," and furthermore that birds are "only transitorily within the State and [have] no permanent habitat therein."
Id. at 434-35. As stated in his opinion, Holmes feared that without the federal protection of the treaty and statute, there would
soon be no birds in need of protection. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
Since discharges of dredged and fill material into isolated waters and pollution of isolated waters can destroy or degrade the
habitat of migratory birds, Congress can justify legislation to protect isolated waters as a necessary and proper means of implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty and the protection of
migratory birds. In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Holland, it is possible that Congress may be able to regulate a
broader class of activities under the Treaty Power than is appropriate under the Commerce Clause. See Stephen M. Johnson,
FederalRegulation of Isolated Wetlands After SWANCC, 31 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10669 (June 2001). In the same way that
the Treaty Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause authorized Congress to enact legislation to protect migratory birds, those
powers may authorize Congress to act to limit the destruction or
degradation of isolated waters, even though such legislation, in
the absence of a treaty, might be outside of Congress' power in
light of the Tenth Amendment, or beyond Congress' Commerce
Clause powers. See id.
B.

Suave Will Argue Congress May Not Usurp its
Constitutional Limitations Under the Guise of the Treaty
Power

One primary limitation placed on the treaty power by courts
is to hold a treaty invalid if it violates specific provisions of the
Constitution. For example, in Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court
held that the federal government cannot, through a treaty, dehttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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prive citizens of their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 354
U.S. 1, 16 (1957). In its decision, the Court stated that there is
nothing in the language of the Supremacy Clause "which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not
have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution." Id. The
Supreme Court in Holland told us that Congress can approve
treaties and enact implementing regulations under the authority
of a treaty to protect birds of international commerce. See 252
U.S. 416 (1920). However, the federal government may not, by
treaty, expand its Commerce Clause jurisdiction beyond constitutional limitations. Similarly, Congress may not justify congressional usurpation of state authority over isolated waters in order
to end-run its inability to exercise jurisdiction over those waters
under the Commerce Clause. Ultimately, if all Congress was doing
was exercising Commerce Clause power to protect water highways, then it was not permitted to do so.
Moreover, there is no indication either in the statutory language itself, or in the legislative history, that Congress was acting
pursuant to the Treaty Clause when it enacted the CWA. Rather,
the Senate Report discusses Commerce Clause jurisdiction, while
there is no mention of the Treaty Clause. Under 16 U.S.C. § 703
of the Migratory Bird Treaty, Congress specifically states that it is
unlawful "to pursue, hurt, take, capture, kill . . . any migratory
bird ...... pursuant to the terms of the conventions between the
United States and Great Britain, Mexico, Japan and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics "for the conservation of migratory birds
and their environments." In contrast, nothing in the CWA statute
language nor in the legislative history indicates that Congress
was enacting the CWA pursuant to the Treaty Power. Rather,
congressional reports discuss only Commerce Clause jurisdiction.
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DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN HOLDING THAT
FIRED SHOT AND SKEET PARTS ARE NOT
SOLID WASTE WHEN THEY FALL TO THE
GROUND UNDER EPA'S DEFINITION OF
SOLID WASTE IN 40 C.F.R. § 262.2?

V. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN HOLDING THAT
FIRED SHOT AND SKEET PARTS ARE NOT
SOLID WASTE WHEN THEY FALL TO THE
GROUND UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)?
[Note: Because these issues are interrelated, they are addressed
concurrently rather than as separate issues.]
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") "is a
comprehensive environmental statute that governs the treatment,
storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste." Meghrig v.
KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996). The aim of RCRA is "to
reduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the
proper treatment, storage, and disposal of that waste which is
nonetheless generated 'so as to minimize the present and future
threat to human health and the environment."' Id. at 483. Consequently, the Act creates a "cradle-to-the-grave" regulatory framework. Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co.,
989 F.2d 1305, 1313 (2d Cir. 1993). Section 6972(a) of RCRA authorizes citizen suit provisions: (1)(A) against any person alleged
to be in violation of any requirement; or (1)(B) against any person,
who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any
solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 42
U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(A) & (1)(B) (1994). Plaintiff, BOG, alleges
that Suave is violating RCRA by disposing of hazardous waste
(skeet, skeet parts and lead shot) into and about Sheldrake Pond
without a Section 6925(a) permit. This violation is actionable
under 42 U.S.C. Section 6972(a)(1)(A). Plaintiff also alleges that
Suave's disposal of solid and hazardous waste into and about the
Pond is creating an imminent and substantial endangerment, actionable under 42 U.S.C. Section 6972(a)(1)(B).
Under RCRA, "hazardous wastes" are a subset of "solid
wastes." Remington, 989 F.2d at 1313 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5)).
Congress defined the term "hazardous waste" as a "solid waste"
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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which exhibits enumerated hazardous characteristics. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(3). Therefore, for a waste to be classified as hazardous, it
must first qualify as a solid waste under RCRA. See United Techs.
Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 821 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Congress
broadly defined "solid waste" in the statute as: "any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded
material ... resulting from industrial, commercial, mining and
agricultural operations, and from community activities," along
with a few specific exclusions. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). The statute
does not, however, define "discarded," thereby creating an uncertainty whether Defendant's spent lead shot and skeet parts are
"solid waste." Legislative history does not satisfactorily assist in
resolving this uncertainty. See Remington, 989 F.2d at 1314. The
legislative history reflects that by regulating the "disposal of discarded materials and hazardous wastes" under RCRA, the committee was not only concerned with regulating the nation's
manufacturing by-products, but also the products themselves once
they have served their intended purposes and are no longer
wanted by the consumer. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491
(1976)). However, the legislative history does not indicate at what
point products have served their intended purposes.
Hazardous waste disposal is regulated by Subchapter III of
RCRA. Subchapter III jurisdiction depends on whether or not a
particular substance is hazardous waste as defined in that Subchapter. Congress charged the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") with the task of developing and
promulgating regulations "identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste, and listing particular hazardous wastes (within the
meaning of Section 6903(5)), which shall be subject to the provisions of [Subchapter III]. . .." 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b) (1994). The regulations governing the identification and listing of hazardous
waste include a regulatory definition of "solid waste" that "applies
only to wastes that are also hazardous for purposes of the regulations implementing [Subchapter III] of RCRA." 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.1(b)(1) (2001). For purposes of Subchapter III, EPA has provided a regulatory definition of solid waste that is distinct from
the statutory definition. The regulatory definition is narrower
than its statutory counterpart. The regulations define solid waste
as "any discarded material" and in turn define discarded material
as, among other things, "abandoned." Id. § 261.2(a). Material is
deemed "abandoned" if it is: "(1) [d]isposed of; or (2) [blurned or
31
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incinerated; or (3) [a]ccumulated, stored, or treated (but not recycled) before or in lieu of being... disposed of, burned or incinerated." Id. § 261.2(b).
As discussed in Remington, "[t]he EPA distinguishes between
RCRA's regulatory and remedial purposes and offers a different
definition of solid waste depending upon the statutory context in
which the term appears." 989 F.2d at 1314. As a result, RCRA
regulations create a dichotomy in the definition of solid waste. See
Remington, 989 F.2d at 1314. The regulations state that the statutory definition of solid waste, rather than the more narrow regulatory definition, applies to "imminent hazard" lawsuits brought
by the United States under 42 U.S.C. Section 6973. 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.1(b)(2)(ii) (2001). Furthermore, according to 40 C.F.R. Part
261.1(b)(1) (2001), citizen suits enforcing the EPA's hazardous
waste regulations under 42 U.S.C. Section 6972(a)(1)(A) invoke
the narrow regulatory definition of solid waste. The regulations
are silent, however, on which definition of solid waste is to be applied to the second citizen suit, authorizing citizens to sue to abate
"imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994). The court in Remington concluded that regulatory language referring to Section 6973
must also apply to section 6972(a)(1)(B), because the two provisions are nearly identical. See 989 F.2d at 1314 (citing Comite Pro
Rescate de la Salud v. PuertoRico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 888
F.2d 180 (1st Cir. 1990)).
B.

The Arguments

[Note: Conceptually, these arguments are most easily addressed
and understood simultaneously and have therefore not been
briefed in the traditional subheading manner.]
All three parties agree that the statutory definition of "solid
waste" applies to BOG's Section 6972(a)(1)(A) claim and that the
regulatory definition applies to its Section 6972(a)(1)(B) claim.
However, the parties disagree on what "solid waste" means under
each definition and whether fired shot, skeet and skeet parts are
waste when they hit the ground for the purposes of either citizen
suit claim. Suave argues that using a consumer product for its
intended use does not constitute disposal of the product under either definition. It argues that shot, like a golf ball, is not discarded in either sense when it is fired and falls to the ground, for
that is its intended purpose. BOG argues that the consumer product exclusion applies to neither definition. It is the EPA's position
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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that the consumer use exception applies to the regulatory definition of solid waste for purposes of Section 6972(a)(1)(A), but that it
does not apply to the statutory definition of solid waste for purposes of Section 6972(a)(1)(B). Therefore, in order to resolve this
issue, it must be determined whether and, if so, at what point lead
shot and skeet parts become "discarded," under either definition.
Since the term "discarded" may have different meanings for
the regulatory and statutory definition of "solid waste," each citizen suit pursued by Plaintiff must be analyzed according to the
applicable definition. The parties agree that the EPA's regulatory
definition of "discarded" includes material that is abandoned, recycled, considered inherently waste-like, or a military munition
identified as solid waste in 40 Part C.F.R 266.202. 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.2(a)(1). Material is deemed "abandoned" if it is: "(1)
[dlisposed of; or (2) [blurned or incinerated; or (3) [a]ccumulated,
stored, or treated (but not recycled) before or in lieu of being...
disposed of, burned or incinerated." Id. § 261.2(b). Thus, Plaintiff's action against Suave for violating RCRA Section
6972(a)(1)(A), will turn on whether the lead shot and skeet parts
are "abandoned." The statute, on the other hand, does not further
define the term "discarded." In interpreting "discarded," the
courts have used the ordinary dictionary meaning which is "to
throw away; reject." The American Heritage Dictionary 402 (2d
ed. 1982). However, while interpreting the statutory definition of
solid waste, EPA has stated that materials are discarded when
they have been "left to accumulate long after they have served
their intended purpose." Conn. Coastal Fishermen'sAss'n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1313 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing the
EPA's amicus curiae position). Accordingly, resolution of Plaintiff's "imminent and substantial endangerment" suit under RCRA
Section 6972(a)(1)(B) will require an analysis of the EPA's interpretation of when a consumer product has served its intended
purpose.
1.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals Case Law on
"Discarded"

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has addressed the
meaning of "discarded" in the statutory definition of "solid waste"
in several cases. These cases all addressed whether material used
in a manufacturing process is waste after being used and subsequently recycled or waiting to be recycled. First, in Am. Mining
Cong. v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("AMC I"), the
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Court held that the term "discarded" conforms to its ordinary and
plain meaning. Id. at 1193. Thus, items that are "disposed of,
abandoned, or thrown away" are discarded. Id. The court in AMC
I concluded that "in process secondary materials," that is, materials "destined for immediate reuse in another phase of [an] industry's ongoing production process," are not discarded under RCRA.
Id. at 1185, 1193. This holding was reaffirmed in Ass'n of Battery
Recyclers, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 208 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2000), where
the court reiterated that EPA cannot regulate as solid waste secondary material destined for reuse as part of a continuous industrial process that is therefore not abandoned or thrown away. Id.
at 1053.
At the other end of the spectrum the court has held that a
material that has been "indisputably 'discarded' before being subject to [reclamation] .

.

. has become part of the waste disposal

problem," is therefore subject to regulation as a solid waste. Am.
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("API")
(emphasis in original). In API, the court explained that where a
material was "delivered to [a metals reclamation] facility not as
part of an 'ongoing manufacturing or industrial process' within
'the generating industry,' but as part of a mandatory waste treatment plan prescribed by EPA," the material is not precluded from
being classified by EPA as a solid waste. Id. Finally, material
somewhere between the extremes of ongoing production and indisputable discard was addressed in Am. Mining Cong. v. U.S. EPA,
907 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("AMC I'). In deferring to EPA's
determination, the court held that sludge from wastewater stored
in surface impoundments, which "may" later be reclaimed for
treatment can be regulated as discarded because they are no
longer part of an industrial process. Id. at 1186-87.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals cases interpreting
the statutory definition of "discarded" revolve around whether
wastes that are recycled or destined for recycling are "discarded."
They are of questionable relevance. BOG is likely to argue that
ultimately, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals analyses depended on whether the material in question is "part of the waste
disposal problem" that Congress was addressing with RCRA.
AMC 1, 824 F.2d at 1186. Since Suave is depositing lead shot and
skeet parts into Sheldrake Pond from where their hazardous constituents may be taken up in the food chain, BOG will maintain
that the material is "part of the waste disposal problem" and is
therefore "discarded." Thus, BOG will further argue that relying
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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on the case law interpreting the meaning of "discarded" is proper.
Suave could counter the argument by contending that fired lead
shot and skeet parts are not "discarded," but instead "used." The
placement of lead shot and skeet parts in and around the Pond
after being used is merely the end result of use. Thus, Suave will
argue that since the material at issue in this case is not "discarded," the case law generated by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals is not relevant. Suave might also argue that the cases
are not relevant because they are distinguishing between material
that is "discarded" and "recycled," which is at the other end of the
waste spectrum from spent lead shot.
2.

Consumer Use Exception

The issue of whether fired shot, skeet and skeet parts are hazardous waste when they fall to the ground for purposes of Sections
6972(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) turns on whether the "consumer use"
exception applies. A recent District Court of Puerto Rico case,
Water Keeper Alliance v. U.S. Department of Defense, involved a
similar issue under the Section 6972(a)(1)(B), "imminent and substantial endangerment" claim. 152 F. Supp. 2d 163 (2001). In
Water Keeper Alliance, the court addressed whether an ordinance
used by the Navy during training exercises become "discarded material" as soon as it is fired and makes contact with the land in a
live impact area. Id. In dismissing the Section 6972(a)(1)(B)
claim, the court found that "RCRA does not support [the] contention that munitions become discarded material immediately upon
being fired. . .." Id. at 169. The court's opinion relied on the decision in Remington to conclude that munitions cannot be considered discarded until sometime after they have served their
intended use. Id. at 168. The court adopted the EPA's amicus curiae argument that munitions "eventually" become discarded material by being "left to accumulate long after they have served
their intended purpose." Id. at 167 (citing Dkt. No. 73).
The court in Water Keeper Alliance also relied on a recent case
involving the spraying of pesticides to invoke the "consumer use"
exception. See 152 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (citing No Spray Coalition,
Inc. v. New York, No. 00 Civ. 5395, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13919,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000)). In that case, plaintiffs asserted
that once pesticides are sprayed onto or into the air, land and waters of New York City they become discarded solid wastes. Id.
The Southern District of New York held that, "it would contort the
statutory language and do violence to the intent of Congress in
35
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enacting RCRA to hold that pesticide that has been sprayed but
has yet to reach the mosquitoes or their habitats is "discarded material." Id. The court's holding hinged on the fact that the intended purpose of the spray is to drift through the air until coming
to rest on the mosquitoes and their habitats.
a. Military Munitions Rule
Also pertinent to the "consumer use" exception analysis is the
EPA's Military Munitions Rule ("MMR"), which was upheld in
Military Toxics Projectv. EPA, 146 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The
EPA's regulatory definition of "discarded material" includes "a
military munition identified as a solid waste in 40 C.F.R. Section
266.202." 40 C.F.R. § 261(a)(2)(iv) (2001). The MMR provides an
exception to the definition by stipulating that a military munition
is not a statutory or regulatory solid waste when it is used "for its
intended purpose." Id. § 266.202(a)(1). However, according to the
Rule, a used or fired military munition is a solid waste, and subject to a RCRA Section 6973 claim, if the munition lands off-range
and is not promptly rendered safe and/or retrieved. Id.
§ 266.202(d). Therefore, a military munition that lands on a firing
range is not a solid waste and cannot be a hazardous waste for
purposes of RCRA Section 6972 claims, while a munition that
lands off range and is not retrieved or rendered safe, is a statutory
solid waste and hence is subject to an imminent and substantial
endangerment claim under RCRA Section 6973.
Both BOG and Suave agree that the MMR deals only with
military munitions, not at issue in this case, and therefore the
Rule is irrelevant. However, the EPA argues that although the
Rule may not govern this case, it is relevant in that the principles
embodied in the Rule govern the interpretation of both the statutory and regulatory definitions of solid waste. According to EPA,
the exclusion embodies the Agency's consistent interpretation of
the regulatory definition of solid waste as excluding commercial
products used for their intended use, if their ordinary use results
in their landing on the ground. Thus, EPA interprets its regulatory definition of solid waste to exclude shot landing on the
Groveton Rifle and Pistol Association's firing range, for firing shot
on a firing range is using shot for its intended purpose. Moreover,
the EPA interprets the statutory definition to cover shot landing
off the firing range as in the MMR. Under this interpretation, it is
important to find whether the portion of the Pond owned by the
County is part of the skeet and firing ranges. However, if the inhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17

36

BENCH MEMO

2002]

485

tended use of the ammunition at issue here is to shoot skeet or to
shoot at a target, then as the lower court found, it is not clear why
the purpose is accomplished when the shot lands on a firing range
but is not accomplished when it lands off the range.
3.

Chevron Agency Interpretation Deference

It is well settled that an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the statute or regulation. See Bowles
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Consequently, EPA's interpretation of its own regulation defining solid
waste as not including consumer products used for their intended
purposes is dispositive, absent a conflict with the statute. Unless
BOG can raise such a conflict, BOG's Section 6972(a)(1)(A) claim
against Suave for violating the RCRA permit requirement should
be dismissed.
Suave argues that the statutory definition of solid waste
should be interpreted to exclude consumer products used for their
intended purposes as well. Suave's reasoning is that if materials
do not warrant regulation as solid waste under Section
6972(a)(1)(A), neither do they warrant remedial activities as solid
waste under Section 6972(a)(1)(B). BOG and EPA counter this argument by claiming that EPA's interpretation is that the consumer use exception is not to be applied to the statutory definition
of solid waste and that this interpretation is to be afforded deference under Chevron. The Chevron analysis first addresses
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def Council, 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984). If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous, the question is whether the implementing agency's interpretation of the statute is arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary
to the statute. See id. at 843. Finally, if the agency's interpretation is reasonable, then it is entitled to deference. See id. However, the analysis does not end here as the Supreme Court has
recently limited Chevron deference to agency interpretations that
are embodied in rulemaking. See United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
a.

Stare Decisis and Law of the Circuit

BOG and EPA argue that our Circuit has already decided
that EPA's interpretation that the statutory definition of "solid
37
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waste" does not include a consumer use exception and that decision must be followed under principles of stare decisis. In Neighborhood Against Golf, Inc. v. Recreation Enters., Inc., 150 F.3d
1029 (12th Cir. 1999) ("NAG"), Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the operation of a golf course under RCRA, alleging that the toxic components of accumulated golf balls were leaching into the
groundwater thereby endangering the neighborhood drinking
water supplies. Id. Defendants in NAG argued the golf balls were
not "solid waste" because they were consumer products used for
their intended purpose and hence they were not disposed. Id. The
Twelfth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of Chevron deference to EPA's interpretation that the statutory definition of
solid waste did not except consumer products used for their intended purposes. Id. However, in light of the recent United
States Supreme Court decision in Mead Corp., the NAG court
wrongly applied deference rather then respect EPA's interpretation of RCRA. BOG argues that NAG nevertheless is controlling
precedent in the Twelfth Circuit. Suave and EPA counter argue
that to hold as such would forever bar courts in the Circuit from
correct statutory interpretation.
A decision of a panel of the Court of Appeals is the law of the
circuit and a later panel is compelled to follow it unless an inconsistent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court requires modification
of the decision, or the circuit court sitting en banc overrules the
prior decision. 2A Federal Procedure: Rule of Interpanel Accord
§ 3:851 (Lawyers ed., 1994). A Court of Appeals is bound by the
decisions of the Supreme Court, even though the judges of the
Court of Appeals feel that a decision of the Supreme Court is unsound or in error. Id. § 3:704. The essential principles of stare
decisis may be described as follows: (1) an issue of law must have
been heard and decided, (2) if "an issue is not argued, or though
argued is ignored by the court, or is reserved, the decision does not
constitute a precedent to be followed", (3) "a decision ...

is stare

decisis despite the contention that the court was not properly instructed by counsel on the legislative history, or that the argument was otherwise insufficient," (4) a decision may properly be
overruled if "seriously out of keeping with contemporary views ...
[or] passed by in the development of the law.., or... proved to be
unworkable," and (5) there is "a heavy presumption that settled
issues of law will not be reexamined." Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Frank J. Trabucco, 791 F.2d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir.
1986) (citing 1B Moore's Federal Practice 0.402[2], 30-55).
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/17
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This Circuit must not follow its law of the circuit in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Mead Corp., qualifying Chevron
deference to agency interpretations that are embodied in rulemaking. See 533 U.S. 218. This Circuit's decision in NAG was based
on Chevron deference for an agency interpretation not embodied
in rulemaking. According to recent intervening Supreme Court
case law, such deference is not appropriate. BOG will likely argue
that the Supreme Court decision in Mead Corp., does not constitute precedent for this case because it was not addressing the issues raised here. Assuming that to be true, it is still to be
considered "seriously out of keeping with contemporary view...
[or] passed by in the development of law," and thus may be overruled. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 791 F.2d at 9-10.
Therefore, the court should analyze the EPA's interpretation of
the RCRA statutory definition of "solid waste" according to Mead
Corp., irrespective of this Circuit's prior holding in NAG.
b.

Mead Corp. Agency Interpretation Relative Respect

Under Mead Corp., agency interpretations not embodied in
rulemakings are entitled only to such respect as may be warranted by the formality of the agency's determination, the consistency of the agency's interpretation and its persuasiveness. See
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 303 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 139-40'(1944)). BOG and EPA argue that EPA's definition of "solid waste" is indeed embodied in a rule, namely 40
C.F.R. Part 261.1(b)(2)(ii). That rule, however, only explicitly provides that the statutory definition of "solid waste" applies to the
EPA imminent and substantial endangerment claim under RCRA
Section 6973 but does not deal with whether the consumer use
exception applies to the imminent and substantial endangerment
claim that BOG invokes under RCRA Section 6972(a)(1)(B). See
40 C.F.R. pt. 261.1(b)(2)(ii). Therefore, under Mead Corp., EPA's
interpretation that the statutory definition of "solid waste" does
not include a consumer use exception is entitled only to relative
respect, not substantial respect.
The final question to be considered is to what degree of respect is EPA's interpretation of the statute entitled. In order to
resolve this, an analysis under Mead Corp.'s three-pronged inquiry is required. See 533 U.S. at 304. The first question to address is how formal was the process in which EPA made the
interpretation? The EPA's interpretation has not been formally
developed or adopted in a notice-and-comment rulemaking or for39
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mal adjudication. The second prong to consider is how consistent
has EPA been in its interpretation? The EPA has long interpreted
its definition of "discarded material" not to include consumer
goods used for their intended purposes. In the 1993 case of Connecticut Coastal Fishermen'sAssociation v. Remington Arms Company, 989 F.2d 1305, 1316 (2d Cir. 1993), EPA filed an amicus
curiae brief stating that the statutory definition of solid waste encompasses lead shot and clay targets because they are 'discarded.'
Id. The EPA has since stated that it "sees no compelling reason to
alter this longstanding interpretation of its regulatory definition
of the term 'solid waste."' Military Munitions Rule: Hazardous
Waste Identification and Management; Explosives Emergencies;
Manifest Exemption for Transport of Hazardous Waste on Rightof-Ways on Contiguous Properties, 62 Fed. Reg. 6622, 6630 (Feb.
12, 1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265,
266, and 270). The MMR is but an extension of the EPA's regulatory definition of solid waste as excluding products, such as pesticides and fertilizers, the intended use of which involves
application to the land. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2001).
EPA continues to interpret the RCRA Subchapter III regulations
as not extending to products whose use involves application to the
land, or where use necessarily entails land application, when
those products are used in their normal manner. Rather, the firing of munitions is within the normal and expected use of the
product. In the Preamble to the MMR, EPA states that,
Under RCRA, the use of products for their intended purpose,
even when the use of the product results in deposit on the land,
does not necessarily constitute "discard," is not waste management, and is not subject to regulation. For example, RCRA does
not regulate the use of pesticides by farmers, even though pesticides are discharged to the environment during use (see 40
C.F.R. Sections 262.10(d) and 262.70 (2001)). By the same logic,
RCRA does not regulate the use of dynamite or other explosives
during quarrying or construction activities. EPA has consistently held that the use of munitions (military or otherwise) for
their intended purpose does not constitute "discard," and therefore is not a waste management activity.
Military Munitions Rule: Hazardous Waste Identification and
Management; Explosives Emergencies; Manifest Exemption for
Transport of Hazardous Waste on Right-of-Ways on Contiguous
Properties, 62 Fed. Reg. at 6628.
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EPA disagrees with a commenter's proposition in the MMR
Preamble that munitions are a "solid waste" when they hit the
ground because they have no further function, unlike pesticides,
which continue to have a function on the ground. See id. EPA's
interpretation focuses on whether a product was used as it was
intended to be used, not on whether a product is to perform some
function once on the ground. Therefore, the Agency is maintaining its position that munitions that are fired are products used for
their intended purpose, even when they hit the ground since hitting the ground is a normal expectation for their use. See id.
The final step in the Mead Corp. analysis is how persuasive is
EPA's interpretation? EPA's interpretation of the statutory definition to exclude the consumer use exception is very persuasive in
light of the purpose of RCRA. In the MMR Preamble, EPA responds to a comment expressing concern over the relative merits
of not regulating the munitions on an active range while regulating munitions that land off a range. See Military Munitions Rule:
Hazardous Waste Identification and Management; Explosives
Emergencies; Manifest Exemption for Transport of Hazardous
Waste on Right-of-Ways on Contiguous Properties, 62 Fed. Reg. at
6632. EPA states that the Agency views the firing of munitions
that land on active ranges as product use, while munitions that
land off range and are not promptly rendered safe and/or retrieved, are more like a spill that is not promptly remediated. See
id. at 6633. EPA considers such munitions to be "discarded,"
"abandoned," or "disposed of' and thus statutory solid waste potentially subject to RCRA corrective action. See id. This distinction makes sense since consumer products such as pesticides and
lead shot cannot be integrated with the RCRA regulatory scheme
when used for their intended purpose. To do so would mean that a
hunter would be required to tie a RCRA manifest on a bullet
before firing it. Furthermore, the hunter would have to assure
that the bullet lands on a permitted transport, treatment and disposal facility. Therefore, a consumer product, such as lead shot,
used for its intended purpose cannot be "discarded" in the regulatory sense. However, hazardous consumer products such as pesticides and lead shot could create imminent and substantial
endangerments even though used for their intended purpose,
thereby warranting remedial action. For the statutory definition
as used in RCRA Section 6972(a)(1)(B), the statute is looking at
what materials cause sufficient environmental concerns to require
cleanup on a quasi-public nuisance basis, even though the materi41
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als were never subject to the regulatory scheme. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994). When lead shot and skeet parts accumulate in a pond they have the potential to cause serious harm to
benthic and waterfowl populations as well as the entire food
chain. Thus, it is within the RCRA regime to include fired bullets
when they aggregate in large, post-consumer use quantities that
pose environmental problems and are "part of the waste problem."
EPA's interpretation is therefore entitled to relative respect
under Mead Corp. because it has been longstanding and is persuasive. The Court should hold that the consumer use exception does
not apply to the statutory interpretation of "solid waste." Accordingly, the Court should reverse the judgment of the lower court in
part and remand BOG's Section 6972(a)(1)(B) imminent and substantial endangerment claim for consideration on the merits.
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